In November 2002, the unit headed by general Ardeleanu set Europe ablaze, grounding their allegation on a .reliable source.. In fact, the reliable source was an anony-mous letter. The victim: Florin Padure, a Romanian established in Leipzig.

Suspected of planning to sabotage the Prague Summit, the man was shadowed by the Germans, but found not guilty. The clumsiness of the Direction for Information Protection within the Home Affairs Ministry triggered an international spy operation. The target: Florin Padure, a Romanian citizen established in Germany. In keeping with the documents issued by the above-mentioned department, Padure would have intended to sabotage the NATO Summit in Prague. Romanian playwright Ion Luca Caragiale wrote, more than a century ago: .One needs to have my guts to sign it, so we will send an anonymous letter!. Who could have guessed however, that nowa- days, the celebrated assertion would accu- rately describe the working system of the Romanian secret services? The following lines provide details on a secret operation of the Romanian infor- mation services . an operation that set ablaze, without reason, the authorities of several countries . as well as on the way, 13 years after the Revolution, the Romanian authorities still chase .terror-ists. outside the country.s borders. Padure, the terroristPadure is a 33-year-old Romanian citizen who has lived since 1995 in the German town of Leipzig. Until recently, Padure was one of the many Romanians who defected to Western Europe for a better life. He obtained a job in Germany and even married a German. Life seemed to have reached normality in what the young Romanian was concerned.
By the end of last year, though, everything changed radically. In November 2002, Padure was one of the most wanted on the German territory. For 10 days, each step Padure took was monitored and recorded by German authorities, within a wide ranging pursuit and surveillance action. The reason of it? Padure was sus- pected at the time of intending to organize and lead a terrorist group! Consequently, his telephone calls were taped, and every step our Romanian fellow made, was filmed and photographed. All the persons that contacted him during this period were in turn kept under surveillance, and some of them interviewed. The operative monitoring the subject of which was Padure was concluded as of the evening of November 21, even before the NATO Summit in Prague, where Romania was invited to accede as an ally.
Target: NATO Summit in Prague
This is Padure.s story, told by himself. .The German police notified me, as of the beginning of December, that I was a suspect for organizing a terrorist network, made up of Romanians established in the West, whose target was undermining the NATO Summit in Prague, through violet actions. I also found out that I was believed to organize several self-settings on fire in front of official buildings. .All these accusations came from Romania, through the intermediary of the Romanian Embassy in Prague. The German authorities followed me day in, day out, followed on the heels of my friends and interviewed my superiors at work. .Now, when everything is over, they realize the have wasted their time. As for myself, I am left with huge problems on my plate. My wife does no more know what to believe, my friends glance suspiciously at me. .At the office, they told me my contract would not be extended, so I am out of work. My boss told me that he had no more work for me, but I know he did. And I also know that he was questioned about me and he did not want to have troubles because of me. .Even if now the matter is cleared up, the very suspicion that I might deal with such a thing scares the wits out of them. Here, after September 11, 2001, people became very sensitive about anything that may relate to terrorism. Practically, my life was destroyed due to steps decided in Romania.
Dealt with by Romanians
I confronted Padure.s story with the official documents held by Saxony Land Police. These documents show that as of November 8, the Land police received, from the examining magistrate, a mandate to perform a long term monitoring on Padure, allowing for the use of hidden operative technique (audio, video, etc.) The mandate expired on November 22. The monitoring began on November 10, at 12.15 hours and ended on November 21, at 20.30. The decision made by the examining magistrate was grounded on the existence of information provided by the Romanian Ministry for Home Affairs (MHA), concerning Padure.s intention to organize violent protests during the Summit in Prague. So, the sole information used by German authorities was the data provided by the Romanian Ministry for Home Affairs that described their informer as a very reliable source. Confident in the Romanian source, considered very reliable by the officials in Bucharest, the Germans of the Criminology Office of Saxony Land made one more additional check: the acknowledgement of Padure.s address. The judge mentioned that, since this first item of information coming from the Romanians was confirmed, then all initial information could be true. Furthermore, the judge showed concern for a possible threat to other persons, which explains a long term monitoring and, implicitly, the restriction of Padure.s rights. Before reaching the German authorities, the information on Padure, coming from Romania, transited the Directionfor International Relationships within the MHA and also the Romanian Embassy in Prague. On September 12, 2002, the liaison officer of the MHA within the Embassy forwarded the data received to the Head of the Czech Police. Though during our telephone conversation, Valentin Balan, the liaison officer in Prague, would not admit it, the official documents showed that a formal contact between the Romanian and the Czech parties was established as of September 12, 2002. The German authorities shadowed me day in, day out, followed on the heels of my friends and interviewed my superiors at the work place. Now they realize themselves that they wasted their time. Myself though, I am left with huge problems on my plate. said Padure.
The MHA Conclusion: Padure was unhappy
After having received the anonymous letter, the staff protection entitywithin the MHA set to work. After only five days, enough data were collected at Bucharest, which . in the opinion of the Romanian authorities . would justify a minute research in Neamt district, the Padure.s native place. When the research performed by the authorities in Neamt was concluded, they sent, in July 11, a reply to Bucharest, mentioning that Padure was away from the country for several years, being established in Germany. Furthermore, the officers in Neamt wrote that the suspect would have certain .dissatisfactions.
Correction:”.The international political context”
The alert Officer of MU 0962 would not bother to mention the kind of dissatisfactions Padure experienced. The fact is that Bucharest authorities decided to forward these data to the Czech Police. On September 12, the head of this body received the information from the Romanian liaison officer. One month later, the Criminality Department of Saxony Land ceaselessly monitored Padure. MU 0962 practically found no information on Padure that would confirm the fact that the anonymous letter contained coherent data.
But . the officers would say . .the international political context within which the letter was sent. made consideration of such mandatory. More serious, though, is the fact that the Czech Police and the German authorities were assured by the Romanian party that the MHA informer .is always reliable.. Which meant the MHA were aware of the informer.s identity and also that they had previously collaborated with him.However, what neither the Germans nor the Czechs knew was the fact that the socalled informer was an anonymous letter. Following this lead, we found out the internal protection office of the MHA (the ex MU 0215, also called .a quarter past two.) opened an informative supervision brief on the name of Padure, as early as June 27, 2002. LEADS: The information grounding the opening of this brief is comprised in an anonymous later, sent to the address of the MHA in Bucharest, more precisely, to the attention of Minister Ioan Rus. The letter was signed by .a group of revolutionaries. and drawn up by a person used to police paper work. The one who wrote it set a several centimeters wide standard left margin, and drew it up on two separate leaves, and not on a front and back leaf. The very way they would do it for statements or notes attached to police briefs.
DANGEROUS.The letter unmasked Padure in a “communist comrade” way.
He is said to .have abandoned the ideals of the December .89 Revolution. and wished to prevent Romania from acceding to the NATO. It is also said that Padure had certain dissatisfactions, which he displayed publicly, and that he had been an active participant in the Revolution. Furthermore, the letter mentioned that he had bragged about holding a series of video cassettes taken during the Revolution, which could compromise important personalities, had they been sent to the media. ANTI-NATO. The letter contains all the information that reached the German authorities, on the violent protests, on the organization of a group of Romanians established in the West, on the fact that Padure would lead this group and would have persuaded several followers to set themselves on fire in Prague, during the Summit. THE GEAR. It seams incredible, but the information contained in an anonymous letter that reached the MU 0962, the secret service of the MHA . the ex .two and a quarter. . set in motion an infernal gear, involving several secret services, police offices in several countries, supervision technique, etc. To say nothing of the German taxpayer.s money, wasted to finance a wide scale surveillance process, carried out for 11 days on a row.
An internal office with international powers?
The involvement of MU 0962 in a case having international ramifications is at least suspect, and goes beyond the competences of the secret service within the MHA. Practically, the MU 0962 was established in January 1990, upon initiative of Gelu Voican Voiculescu, Vice prime minister of Petre Roman Administration. At the time, 400 officers of Directorate IV within State Security Direction and of the DSS Bucharest, were grouped under the denomination of MU 0215. Better known under the name .two and a quarter., the unit.s object was to protect the officers of the Ministry for Home Affairs. The command of .two and a quarter. was ensured by a series of ex Security officers and controversial characters. Among these, we would mention Florin Calapod, one of the heads of 0215, who later went into business and sold Viagra on the Internet. In 1999, under the command of general Ardeleanu, the office was reformed and became MU 0962. Besides the competences to protect officers, the new office was also empowered to collect information on the internal market.
By Stefan Candea, Sorin OzonSaturday, August 17th, 2002 Source: http://www.crji.org